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Let's do a little quick review.

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We have seen firsthand how powerful a spear fishing campaign can be when you send it out to targeted

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people that, you know, use a certain social network that you believe use a certain bank that maybe

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users of your email system within your organization or people who just log in to Gmail, Gmail, thank

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goodness, will at least ask you your username on one screen and your password on another.

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That makes it much safer than having the username and password login and password all on a single screen.

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But there are lots of systems out there.

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Most banks, most social media sites still give you the username and password in a single page, and

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it makes it susceptible to this type of email credential harvesting that we just saw.

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So quick recap.

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Phishing is the number one attack vector when it comes to social engineering, online pretexting, pretending

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to have that email come from Facebook baiting.

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And we could put something in that email that says, Bryson, there are embarrassing pictures of you

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up at Facebook or it looks like your account has been hacked from an address.

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It looks like it's coming from China and put an odd address in there, whatever it may be, that will

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bait the user's quid pro quo.

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One recent scam that's been going out as a phishing email is the ability to set up a verified social

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user account like the real Donald Trump at Twitter.

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Right.

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A verified social media account sounds like a really good thing to have.

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So I could have the real Bryson pain on Twitter.

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But when you click through, you have to be really careful, go directly to the website.

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And that's a better way to avoid being taken by these click through links.

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We didn't use tailgating in this particular instance and we didn't make use of phishing or smooshing.

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We didn't send a voicemail or make a phone call.

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We didn't send a text message with the link.

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But it's just as easy to take this link, turn it into a text message and send it to someone on an Android

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device, the same way we just saw how to do it on a Linux device.

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And finally we learned the power of spear fishing.

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That's when we take a targeted approach at getting someone in our social network, in our organization.

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So someone might send an email to your CEO, to your finance officer, to your chief business officer,

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to your H.R. director.

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And once you get one of those sets of username and password combinations, you can do some really bad

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things over the Internet.

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You can log in as the boss and send an email to all employees that they're fired or send an employee

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to the chief business officer or to the treasurer of the organization and say that you need some money

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transferred to a certain account to keep one of your customers there.

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All kinds of bad things that can happen to your organization if your employees fall for spearfishing.

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There are lots of bad things that can happen to your family.

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If one of your older parents or if you have young children going online, predators, con artists,

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scammers are all out there on the Internet using techniques like these.

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It costs nothing to send thousands of emails and all it takes is one person clicking through.

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But unfortunately, we see that even in the best trained organizations, as many as five percent of

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people will click through and provide their credentials.

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In an organization with no training, that number is significantly higher, about five times higher,

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23 percent on average, according to one Verizon study.

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So spearfishing, again, was just a focused email attack.

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And we saw how to craft one of those by using the social engineers toolkit to create a Web server that

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looks just like Facebook or Twitter or your bank or your email login at work.

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We set up a server running locally that was a credential harvester site that looks exactly like the

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Facebook dotcom login site, but it's running on our local call address.

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Mine was ten point nine four and we saw using the IP address converter that we could change that ten

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point nine to four to one hundred sixty seven, seven seventy four for sixty eight address.

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And then we could craft a U.

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RL that looked exactly like http colon slash slash w ww that Facebook dot com at one sixty seven 774

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for sixty eight.

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And that Assim will remember, converted that first part into a username.

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And if I copy that.

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And pasted over into my Firefox browser, it will pop up a warning, I copy that and pasted over into

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any of my Web browsers as that longer address it'll resolve to our ten point nine to four address.

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But most people don't look up in the address bar as often as we should.

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So this number, that one sixty seven 774 468 resolves to that ten point nine for address and takes

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people unwittingly to our internal phishing server.

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And you will only be able to do this attack from a local area network that allows people to surf to

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that ten, nine, four address so you can do it safely from your computer, from one IP address or one

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virtual machine to the other, like from your Windows box or Android box to this call Linux server.

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But you won't be able to send somebody on the public Internet, somebody on a different network, at

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a different school, at a different organization, because thank goodness we're blocked by our Internet

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service provider from doing that.

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To do that.

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Well, attackers will set up a full server running someplace on an IP address or get a dynamic IP address

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and then send out phishing emails like this in targeted attacks.

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But we are not bad attackers.

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We are ethical hackers.

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We will not send this outside our network anyway.

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And you only want to use this to do training inside your own network or to show your friends and family

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how easy it is to fall for an IP address.

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That looks correct, but take them to a phishing server.

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And the way we got people to click through to that phishing server was just by crafting an email using

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a real email from a social network and changing all of those you URLs to our HDTV.

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Cohen's language about face dotcom at and then our IP address of our Cauli Linux box at as a decimal

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integer.

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And we just had to do that for every single one of the links in this email so that it looked convincing.

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But it is devastating how powerful the spear spearfishing attacks are in an organization to family,

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to friends.

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If you've got an older family member who's susceptible to scams, you need to show them that this is

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possible and tell them never to click through this link.

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They always need to type out WDW that Facebook dotcom directly in their browser window to make sure

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that they get the right address.

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Don't click through any suspicious link ever in an email.

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We'll talk a little bit more about how to avoid how to spot and stop phishing in.

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The next lesson is a little bonus.

